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I N  R E C E N T  Y E A R S , T H E  I N T E R N E T H A S
been plagued by a number of worms. One
popular mechanism that worms use to
detect vulnerable targets is random IP
address-space probing. This is feasible in
the current Internet due to the use of 32-bit
addresses, which allow fast-operating
worms to scan the entire address space in a
matter of a few hours. The question has
arisen whether or not their spread will be
affected by the deployment of IPv6. In par-
ticular, it has been suggested that the 128-
bit IPv6 address space (relative to the cur-
rent 32-bit IPv4 address space) will make
life harder for the worm writers: assuming
that the total number of hosts on the
Internet does not suddenly increase by a
similar factor, the work factor for finding a
target in an IPv6 Internet will increase by
approximately 296, rendering random scan-
ning seemingly prohibitively expensive.
Some worms, such as Melissa, spread by email.
These worms will not be affected by the adoption
of IPv6; though the space of possible email
addresses is vast, these worms typically consult
databases such as Microsoft Outlook’s address
book.
On the other hand, life will indeed be harder for
address-space scanners, such as Code Red and
Slammer. Clever heuristics can cut the search
space dramatically. More specifically, multi-level
searching and spreading techniques can negate the
defender’s advantage. However, the code size
required for worms will increase, which may help
prevent Slammer-like attacks. This has created the
impression that an IPv6 Internet would be imper-
vious to similar kinds of worms.
In the past, there have been two forms of address-
space scans. Some worms use a uniformly distrib-
uted random number generator to select new tar-
get addresses. This strategy is indeed unlikely to
succeed in an IPv6 world. Other worms preferen-
tially spread locally, by biasing the search space
toward addresses within the same network or sub-
net. This will be a more successful strategy,
though at first glance the 80-bit local space (near-
ly twice Avogadro’s number!) would seem to be a
formidable obstacle. We observe that certain strategies can improve the
attacker’s odds. In particular, by taking advantage of local knowledge and
patterns in address-space assignment, the attack program can cut the
search space considerably.
We discuss a number of strategies worms could use in an IPv6-based
Internet to find new targets. We separate these into two categories, wide-
area and local-area searches, somewhat mirroring the IPv6 address archi-
tecture. We argue that worms will use different types of information
sources to first determine existing networks and establish a presence there,
and then spread locally inside an organization. We hope to illustrate that
simple reliance on the IPv6 address space for protection against scanning
worms is not a wise defensive strategy, and we suggest areas where
research could assist in detecting and limiting future worm propagation.
The IPv6 Addressing Architecture
Addresses in the IPv6 addressing architecture, defined in RFC 3513, come
in a number of different flavors. Those of interest to us are link-local ad-
dresses, unique local addresses, global addresses, and multicast addresses.
All forms of unicast address are conceptually divided into two pieces, a
network section and a host section. Roughly speaking, the network section
identifies the particular LAN; the host section identifies the particular node
on the LAN. In fact, both sections have internal structure. Furthermore,
the address is generally divided into two 64-bit halves. (There are sub-
tleties that lie outside the scope of this article.)
In the network section of the address, the first 10 bits denote the scope of
the address. The next 38 bits identify the site and (implicitly) the ISP, as
explained in RFC 3177. In order to promote hierarchical addressing, only
the largest ISPs have their own address allocations; smaller ISPs are
assigned space by their upstream provider. Identifying the set of all ISPs
considerably reduces the search space for the attacker.
The next 16 bits in the network section of the address identify the subnet
within each site. No site will have 216 subnets, though identifying the allo-
cated subnets could pose a challenge for the attacker.
There are several possible formats for the host identifier (the last 64 bits of
the address). Clients will often generate their own addresses via stateless
auto-configuration, as described in RFC 2460.
Sources of Information
As we already mentioned, IPv6 worms can spread by using a two-level
strategy. Here we present several information sources, divided into local
and wide-area sections. We do not claim that this list is exhaustive; howev-
er, the list we do present is probably sufficient and is undoubtedly indica-
tive of a much larger class of information sources that could be exploited.
; LO G I N : F E B R UA RY 2 0 0 6  WO R M  P R O PAG ATI O N  STR ATE G I E S  I N  A N  I P V 6  I NTE R N E T 71
LO C A L  I N F O R M ATI O N  S O U RC E S
N E I G H B O R  D I S COV E RY
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In IPv6, Neighbor Discovery as described in RFC 2461 is used to map IP
addresses to local network addresses (e.g., Ethernet addresses), similar to
the way ARP is used in today’s IPv4 networks. As such, it can be a rich
source of information about machines on the LAN. A sample listing of a
Neighbor Discovery table is shown in Figure 1. A worm that has infected a
node in the LAN can thus determine the addresses of other existing nodes
in the same LAN.
RO UTI N G  TA B L E S  A N D  P ROTO CO LS
Typically, host routing tables only contain entries for other local hosts plus
a default route entry for all traffic outside the LAN. Many organizations,
however, internally run routing protocols such as OSPF or RIP. The few
IPv6 networks we are familiar with actually use RIPng (an adaptation of
RIP for IPv6 networks, described in RFC 2080), and in the future may run
OSPFv6 or IS-IS. In such an environment, a worm would be able to either
directly consult the host routing tables (e.g., using the UNIX netstat com-
mand) or participate in a routing protocol, if only as a passive listener. In
either case, the worm would be able to determine other valid subnets with-
in the organization and subsequently target those [1].
I NTE R FAC E  I D E NTI F I E R S
The Neighbor Discovery tables provide another useful hint: a list of some
locally used network cards. If stateless autoconfiguration is used, the high-
order 32 bits of the low-order (host section) 64 bits of the IPv6 address
identify the manufacturer of the card. In many organizations, common
purchasing patterns mean that LAN cards in use will largely be from a
small set of manufacturers. (We informally sampled two large, heteroge-
neous LANs, one educational and one corporate. In each case, there was a
reduction to about 40 different card types, from 161 and 227 hosts, respec-
tively.) For each such manufacturer identifier, there are at most 224 possi-
ble addresses. This is a search space comparable to what is successfully
exploited by today’s IPv4 worms.
M U LTI C A ST  P I N G
Multicast is a fundamental part of IPv6 design, which unfortunately 
can be abused for target discovery by worms. RFC 3513 notes that
FF0E:0:0:0:0:0:0:101 addresses “all NTP servers in the Internet.” An NTP
query to that address might locate many victims. While such a packet is
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unlikely to traverse the entire Internet, FF05:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 would find all
routers at a site, and FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 would send to all hosts on the local
link. Fortunately, FF05:0:0:0:0:0:0:1, the larger-scope analog to send to all
hosts at a site, is not defined.
A related IPv6 concept is that of “anycast” addresses, defined in RFC 2526,
which can be used to locate the “closest” instance of a service. A worm can
exploit this and other service-location mechanisms such as SLP, DHCP,
DNS, and LDAP to locate local targets for attack. Service-location mecha-
nisms are likely to be increasingly used in an IPv6 Internet, both because
of increased host mobility and due to the difficult-to-memorize addresses.
H O ST  CO N F I G U R ATI O N  A N D  LO G  F I L E S
Computers are generally configured with the addresses of other important
local computers, such as email gateways, local file servers, Web proxy
servers, local DNS servers, the /etc/hosts file in UNIX, SSH known_hosts
files, etc. A sufficiently versatile worm could examine likely places for such
configuration files—the registry on Windows machines is one such loca-
tion—to discover other attack targets. Furthermore, although a worm may
use a non-email infection vector (e.g., a buffer overflow for a popular ser-
vice), it can still use archived user email to find new targets (hostnames).
D N S  ZO N E  TR A N S F E R S
Typical DNS servers are configured such that they do not allow zone trans-
fers from hosts other than the authorized secondary servers. However,
some organizations have a mixed record on restricting zone transfers from
hosts inside that organization. Thus, it may be possible for a worm to
acquire a complete list of all hosts in a domain, once a host inside that
domain has been infected; this list would include all hosts with static
addresses as well as those using Dynamic DNS Updates.
PA S S I V E  E AV E S D RO P P I N G
Although most local area networks are switched, wireless networks offer
the potential for discovering new targets on the local network simply by
monitoring traffic. Furthermore, random-address flooding can be used in
networks such as Ethernet to force a switch to effectively broadcast all
local traffic and incoming external traffic.
W I D E - A R E A I N F O R M ATI O N  S O U RC E S
Wide-area information sources can be used to determine valid IPv6 prefix-
es (networks) to target. Often, they also provide the addresses of valid
hosts (typically servers) in that domain. Even when they do not, however,
they can be used as a starting point for scanning. Although we do not have
sufficient data, an informal poll of network operators suggested that
servers would be assigned addresses statically, and that these addresses
would be located in the low end of the subnet address range, significantly
easing the task of a scanning worm.
RO UTI N G  P ROTO CO LS
Routing protocols provide information on address prefixes that are in use.
These can be used both locally and across the Internet.
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Local use is easy: the attack program just listens to local routing traffic.
This may require joining the “all routers” multicast group, but there are no
access controls that would prevent that from happening.
Remote use is more interesting, but perhaps more problematic. There are
no inherent IPv6 features that would permit easy capture of BGP routing
information by an ordinary host. On the other hand, there are public
archives of routing data, such as the one available at www.routeviews.org.
If this data is available for IPv6—and it is a valuable operational and
research resource—a worm could use it for propagation purposes.
S E RV E R  LO G S
Web, DNS, and incoming email servers are typically contacted by client
machines from many different places. The log files of such contacts offer a
good mechanism for wide-area spread. A more ambitious worm could kill
off the legitimate server and grab its port number, thus collecting new
addresses in real time.
S E RV E R  A D D R E S S E S
Anecdotal evidence suggests that IPv6 servers tend to have low-numbered
addresses. The prefix alone is hard to remember; administrators tend to
select easily memorizable values for the low-order bits. This human ten-
dency can be exploited by worms.
S U BV E RTI N G  N E I G H B O R  D I S COV E RY
A worm-infected host could impersonate the LAN router using Neighbor
Discovery and divert all traffic to/from external hosts to itself. Such attacks
are known and exploited in the current IPv4 Internet (e.g., the dsniff tool-
kit); while they are more difficult in an IPv6 environment, they are still
possible. Using this attack, a worm would be able to find valid IPv6 ad-
dresses outside the local area network (whether in remote organizations or
other LANs within the same organization). Passive eavesdropping can be
equally fruitful in determining remote IP addresses (by capturing incoming
packets), as discussed previously.
S E A R C H E N G I N E S  A N D  D N S
Web search engines are a particularly attractive source of information on
potential targets, especially if the worm is targeting Web servers, as was the
case with Code Red. Although such engines typically only point to Web
servers, they can be used to identify valid prefixes by determining the host-
name of a Web server and resolving its IPv6 address through DNS.
Likewise, DNS itself can be used as a search engine for valid hostnames, by
exhaustively searching for all words (and combinations of words) from a
dictionary. In [2], we showed that a DNS worm in IPv6 could spread as
fast as an IPv4 address-scanning worm.
P E E R-TO - P E E R  P ROTO CO LS
The most intriguing form of wide-area data is peer-to-peer networks. By
participating in topology maintenance, watching queries and responses,
and sending out occasional queries of its own, a worm could learn the
addresses of many different hosts. File-swapping networks such as
Morpheus, Kazaa, and Gnutella offer particularly attractive targets, as do
more “traditional” presence protocols such as IRC, Jabber, and others.
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Strategies for Spreading
Based on our discussion of information sources in the previous section, we
believe that scanning worms in an IPv6 Internet will use a two-phase
approach for discovering and infecting targets:
! Discover valid IPv6 prefixes using search engines, server logs, routing table
information, etc. These sources may indicate specific targets within those
prefixes (e.g., a Web server listed on a search result, or a host participating in
a peer-to-peer network), or simply the valid prefix (as may be the case with
getting a copy of a BGP table). In the second case, targeted address scanning
may be needed, but by starting at the low end of the range a worm will maxi-
mize its chances of finding a server.
! Once inside an organization’s network, use local information sources to
determine the identity (address or hostname) of other nodes to infect. The
repertoire of the worm is significantly richer here, and we believe that vul-
nerable nodes will be infected fairly quickly once the worm has established a
presence.
This two-phase approach can also be extended to propagation. Intuitively,
propagation across organizations calls for an approach distinct from that
used for spreading within organizations. We believe that multi-partite
worms such as Nimda will appear more frequently: email or Web-down-
loadable executable content (e.g., Java or Javascript embedded in every
page served by a Web server) is particularly useful in propagating across
administrative domains, as it appears to be difficult to intercept at the fire-
wall [3]. A worm that manages to infect a popular Web server will be able
to propagate widely and quickly to many different networks, potentially
without raising suspicion for some time (pull model); email worms (push
model) can exploit the social and professional interactions between indi-
viduals and organizations to spread.
More generally, client/server worms can operate efficiently in two different
modes. In client mode, they search for and infect servers of some type.
Once they’ve penetrated a server, they use a different technique to attack
clients that connect to it.
Once a worm has managed to penetrate a new environment, it can switch
to something more akin to traditional address scanning, using the infor-
mation gathered using the techniques described in “Local Information
Sources,” above, as hints to direct the scanning process.
Discussion
The problem of locating hosts is not limited to the authors of malware.
Network administrators and security officers responsible for intranets have
a keen interest in the population of hosts found on their networks. They
generally have extensive tools for auditing and updating such hosts to keep
them up to date. Network management companies are often paid according
to the number of hosts they manage. And, of course, unknown and unreg-
istered hosts that appear on an intranet can be a concern, possibly violat-
ing perimeter security or network connection policy.
On traditional IPv4 intranets, the various techniques described above,
along with simple or multi-protocol network probes, are used for host dis-
covery. A computer inventory, especially including MAC address informa-
tion, can be quite useful for tracking hosts. On IPv4 networks, MAC infor-
mation is obtained, via SNMP, of ARP caches in routers. This incomplete
information is about the best we can do.
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In principle, the Ethernet addresses can be monitored as part of the IPv6
addresses as traffic travels through company checkpoints: the bottom 48
bits of an IPv6 address are supposed to be the MAC address. Whether this
is the MAC address or a small integer, as we have seen, or even a crypto-
graphically derived address as proposed in RFC 3972, well-placed flow
monitors can collect census information. Similar information is already
available from routers on a read-only basis using SNMP version 1 or 2,
which has a sniffable community string. SNMPv3 is not widely used, but
should be—as we have seen, network population information is going to
become more sensitive.
A census of local IPv6 addresses could be kept in each router, up to a
point. These could be collected and consolidated by authorized network
administrators, but should be protected better than current router con-
tents. Network discovery would proceed in two stages: first, discover the
routers, perhaps with traceroute-style Internet mapping techniques, then
gain administrative access to the router and dump the flow history infor-
mation.
In any case, network administrators will be in the same game as the virus
and worm writers, but with the home-field advantage. They need new
tools for IPv6 networks to collect this data, with better protection of the
acquired data from access by malware.
Conclusion
We have outlined a number of techniques that scanning worms can use in
an IPv6 Internet to locate potential targets. These techniques are equally
applicable to the current IPv4 Internet, albeit not as efficient as random
scanning. Although “conventional” address-space scanning is prohibitively
expensive in that environment, we believe that the diversity of sources we
discussed (which is by no means exhaustive) guarantees a rich target set
for worms.
The implication is that we cannot afford to rest on the assumption of
inherent protection in the IPv6 addressing scheme; further research in
worm detection and containment is needed. For our future work, we plan
to investigate how much “coverage” our techniques can give us in the cur-
rent Internet (as a measure of the effectiveness of the approach), as well as
determine ways of monitoring requests to these information sources that
could reveal worm-scanning activity.
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